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Executive Summary
Business property taxes and corporate income taxes play a modest role in industrial location 
when choosing among states. Inequality in tax burdens among school districts, however, can 
influence location within a state. South Carolina's school districts are very unequal in mill rates, 
expenditures per pupil, taxable property per pupil, and industrial/utility property per pupil. These
inequalities are only partly reduced by state aid, which is weighted toward poorer districts. The
remaining differences can discourage firms from locating in school districts with a low fiscal
surplus--high mill rates and low expenditures per pupil. 
Other states have responded to this problem by assigning more of the responsibility of funding 
education to the state. A few states, like Texas and New Mexico, have tried to indirectly equalize
taxable wealth among districts. We propose several remedies that would reduce potential
distortion of industrial location decisions. All of these remedies call for the state to collect
property taxes on state-assessed (industrial) property for school purposes and disburse it to 
school districts on a per-pupil basis. If state-assessed property was limited to paying school taxes
only, while county-assessed property paid taxes only for city and county purposes, this reform



































The location of industrial plants in South Carolina determines an important component of tax 
revenues that support local school districts. When the industrial tax base is large, residential and 
other property owners generally pay a smaller part of the local school bill and often benefit from
a richly supported school district. When industry is scant, the tax burden carried by other 
property owners increases. Per pupil expenditures often fall. Can the system of taxing property 
be altered to equalize tax burdens yet preserve or improve the quality of schools? This tough 
question lies at the heart of this special report prepared by Dr. Holley Hewitt Ulbrich, Alumni
Professor of Economics and Senior Fellow with Clemson's Strom Thurmond Institute. Assisted 
in her work by Karen Boburg, a graduate student in Economics, Dr. Ulbrich examines the issues
and offers policy options to be considered by policy makers and other interested parties. The
Center for Policy and Legal Studies supported this work with funds provided by BB&T of South 
Carolina and is pleased to make the report available. 
Bruce Yandle
Director 
Center for Policy and Legal Studies
I. Introduction
Manufacturing and utility firms, their jobs and their taxable wealth, are distributed very unevenly 
across the state of South Carolina. A heavy concentration of such firms in the upstate, with 
smaller concentrations around Columbia and Charleston, gives those regions of the state a clear 
advantage in terms of job opportunities, income, and resources for education. While the state
pays about half the cost of elementary and secondary education, and distributes the funds in a
somewhat equalizing fashion, about 40% of the burden of paying for K-12 education falls on the
property tax. 
Many wealthier school districts choose to levy relatively high tax rates to support quality 
schools, while others take advantage of their taxable wealth to reduce the mill rate while still
having adequate resources for schools. In either case, the school district provides a "fiscal
surplus" for a large share of taxpayers--benefits in terms of educational quality that exceed the
cost in terms of taxes dedicated to schools. 
The options are less appealing in the poorer districts of Marion, Hampton, and Orangeburg 
County in the low country, which have to choose between settling for poor schools and imposing 
high tax rates that could scare away potential manufacturers, which can do better in the already 
manufacturing-intense upstate and midlands regions. Even with state aid, these districts still
deliver less school quality per dollar of school taxes paid--if not a fiscal deficit for the
representative taxpayer, at least a much smaller fiscal surplus. The result is to create a
disincentive for industrial location in some of the poorer districts in South Carolina and increase

























II. Do Taxes Matter?
The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of school tax and education spending 
differences in South Carolina school districts in relation to the manufacturing and utility tax base
and identify possible policy options. States clearly believe that taxes--specifically, business 
property taxes and corporate income taxes--are important in determining the location of new
manufacturing plants. Every state has some package of business location incentives that includes
reductions in property and/or corporate income taxes. A 1984 study by Bartik examines 13 
factors that could explain the location of new plants among states--the property tax rate, the
corporate tax rate*, the wage rate, unionization*, education levels, unemployment insurance tax 
rate*, workers compensation insurance tax rate, construction costs, land area*, population 
density, existing manufacturing activity*, road miles*, and energy prices. Of these factors, only 
the six marked with an asterisk (*) were significant in any of Bartik's regression models, and 
those six did not include property taxes. [Bartik, 1984] Particularly strong predictors (in terms of
both robustness across model specifications and size of coefficient) are existing manufacturing 
activity, corporate tax rate, and unionization. Bartik's findings are consistent with those reported 
in a more recent survey of such studies by Pomp [1988] and a location decision study by 
Runzheimer [1990]. 
While firms make every effort to ensure that they receive the best possible package of business
location incentives, such incentives appear to play a relatively modest role in location decisions. 
A more recent study by Duffy [1994] finds taxes to be a significant locational factor in only 7 of
19 two digit (SIC) manufacturing groups (taxes include all state and local taxes, not just property 
taxes). These seven industries were apparel, chemicals, petroleum, transportation equipment, 
instruments, and miscellaneous. Even for those industry groups, however, the weighted 
importance of taxes was much smaller than the impact of other factors, particularly market
access and labor market conditions. Both Duffy and Friedman et al. [1992] find that access to 
markets and labor market conditions are consistently the most significant factors in choosing 
between states.
While there is an extensive literature on the location choice among states and regions, however, 
little attention has been given to the decision to locate within a state. Particularly in a small state
like South Carolina, many of the other factors influencing locational choice vary relatively little
between regions of the state. There is an upstate advantage in market access because of the
interstate highways and the proximity to Charlotte and Atlanta. This area also has a history of
manufacturing going back to the early part of the century that receives a high score on the
measure of existing manufacturing activity. But other relevant factors, such as unionization and 
corporate tax rates, are the same throughout the state. While a firm may choose South Carolina
for the kinds of major reasons suggested above, the choice of a location within the state is likely 
to be influenced by factors that appear much less important on a broader interstate scale. 
Property tax differentials, therefore, are much more likely to influence the choice of where to 































III. School Funding, Property Taxes and Industrial Location
Incentives in South Carolina
South Carolina has 91 public school districts serving children in kindergarten through 12th 
grade. Twenty-nine of these districts encompass an entire county. The remaining 17 counties
contain a total of 62 school districts, ranging from two districts each in Bamberg, Dorchester, 
Hampton, Laurens, Richland, and Sumter Counties to seven districts in Spartanburg County and 
eight in Orangeburg County. These 91 districts vary greatly in size, wealth, and mill rates. Even 
within counties, there are substantial differences. Orangeburg's eight districts range in size from
624 pupils in Orangeburg 8 to 3,358 pupils in Orangeburg 3. Spartanburg's seven districts have
mill rates that range from 131 to 195. In Florence, with five school districts, manufacturing 
assessed value per pupil ranges from $256 in Florence 4 to $3,533 in Florence 5. 
Sources of Funds-Schools in South Carolina are funded from a combination of three sources:
the local property tax (40%), state aid (50%), and federal aid (10%) [USACIR 1992]. The burden 
of paying for elementary and secondary education has shifted substantially toward the local
property tax sine 1980, when the property tax paid only 28% of the cost of the public schools. 
Resistance to such tax increases led to a major property tax relief effort by the General Assembly 
in 1995, but relief was limited to homeowners through an expanded homestead exemption. With 
state funding of $195 million for the expanded homestead exemption, the balance of funding 
between local and state sources will shift to about 32% local and 58% state in 1995-96. This shift
restores the state's share to the level of the early eighties. The local share is higher than it was a
decade ago because of diminished federal aid to education. However, it is important to note that
this increased share does not contribute to equalization of resources or reduction of mill rate
differentials among districts; it merely shifts most of the existing property tax burden on 
homeowners to the state. Taxes on business property are not affected. 
School Taxes on Industry-When new plants are established in South Carolina, they are offered 
relief from property taxes, but only from county (or, where applicable, city) taxes. School taxes
are not part of the relief package, so schools almost always represent the only property tax claim
on a new manufacturing firm. Firms coming to South Carolina will pay school property taxes at
a millage rate determined by the school district in which they choose to locate. Those mill rates
ranged from 89 mills in York 2 to 276 mills in Hampton 2 in 1993-94. Those rates mean a tax of
$8.90 per $1000 of assessed value ($.085 per $1000 of market value) of taxable property in York 
2 compared to a tax of $27.60 per $1,000 of assessed value and $1.63 per $1,000 of market value
in Hampton 2. Yet a higher tax price does not guarantee that the manufacturer (or the
homeowner) will enjoy a better school, or even a better funded school. Even after the equalizing 
effects of state aid, per pupil spending in South Carolina's 91 school districts ranges from $4,234 
in Hampton 2 (with a mill rate of 276) to $2,870 in Florence 3 (with a mill rate of 102).
IV. Consequences: Inequality Among School Districts
The agglomeration of manufacturing industries in the upstate is the result of many factors, as
indicated above. Regardless of the causes, however, it is clear that most school districts in the





























interior counties. The countywide school districts in Oconee, Pickens, and Greenville counties, 
as well as all five school districts in Anderson County have school tax rates well below the state
average. These three countywide districts, as well as Anderson 5 (with 40% of Anderson 
County's pupils), also have state-assessed manufacturing, utility, and business personal property 
per pupil that is well above the state average in each case. 
The other major industrial county in the upstate is Spartanburg, which has seven school districts. 
Four of the seven school districts in Spartanburg County are well above the state average in 
industrial property per pupil, and the remaining three range from 88% to 95% of the state
average. However, these seven districts choose to tax themselves more heavily for schools than 
other upstate counties, resulting in mill rates and per pupil spending above the state average.
At the opposite extreme are some of the manufacturing-poor districts of the low country interior-
-Hampton, Orangeburg, Marion, Bamberg, Clarendon, and Allendale. These six counties contain 
21 school districts. All but one (Clarendon 2) are above the state average in school tax millage. 
Five of them collected over 200 mills in 1993-94, compared to a state average of 142.2 mills. At
the same time, all but one (Orangeburg 5) are below the state average in assessed manufacturing, 
utility and business personal property per pupil, and 13 of the 21 have less than 60% of the state
average for state-assessed property per pupil.
There are three important consequences of large differentials in the distribution of this
substantial component of taxable wealth among school districts. First, these inequalities are
probably an obstacle to consolidation of smaller districts into larger, more efficient units. 
Second, inequalities in the wealth base perpetuate inequalities among districts in per pupil
spending for reasons other than local preferences. Third, tax base inequality is sometimes
expressed in tax rate differentials that are likely to have some impact on industrial location in 
ways that will not only perpetuate but actually exacerbate differences in district wealth. 
District Size and Wealth-It is interesting to note that the four upstate counties contain more
than 100,000 pupils but only eight school districts--an average of 13,000 pupils per district. Even 
adding Spartanburg County, which has seven school districts, gives a total of 138,000 pupils in 
15 districts, or an average of 9,200 pupils per district. In contrast, the 21 poor districts in the low
country include 62,212 pupils, or an average of only 3,010 pupils per district. 
The segmentation of counties into many small districts is partly an artifact of history, but it is
perpetuated by school tax differentials. One or more manufacturing plants in one small district is
an obstacle to consolidating school districts because the fortunate district does not wish to "share
the wealth" with other districts. Orangeburg 5, for example, is the only one of eight districts in 
the county with above average state-assessed taxable property per pupil at $10,777. Four of the
other seven districts in Orangeburg County have less than $6,000 per pupil in state-assessed 
property tax base. The same kind of wealth differentials exist in tax-base-rich Spartanburg 
County. Spartanburg 3 and Spartanburg 6 both have more than $15,000 in state-assessed taxable
property per pupil, while less fortunate Spartanburg 1 and Spartanburg 2 have less than $9,000 
per pupil. However, Spartanburg County has some countywide tax base sharing for school














    
    
    
    
 
    
    
    
    
 
    
    
    
    
 
    
    
    
    
 
    
    
    
    
Measures of Inequality-Table 1 shows the range, mean, and median for the relevant fiscal
variables for the 91 school districts. Figures 1, 2 , and 3 show the distribution of values for mill
rates (1991), manufacturing (and utility) tax base per pupil (1991), and per pupil spending (1991-
92) for South Carolina school districts. Note that while the inequality decreases as we move from
Figure 1 to Figure 3, the residual inequality is still substantial.
Table 1
Differences in School Districts in South Carolina




























































Note: a complete table for all 91 districts for the same period (1991 assessed values, 1991-92 

















A number of statistical models were estimated using data in Table 1 and the mill rate and per 
pupil expenditures as dependent variables. The results were generally unsuccessful. However, 
there is evidence that state aid is inversely related to tax base per pupil. There are too many
factors that influence the mill rate and per pupil expenditures to form a clear pattern that can be
discerned by rank correlation or regression analysis. Hampton 2, for example, is one of the
poorest districts in taxable wealth per pupil, but by choosing the highest mill rate in the state, and 
with some state aid, they manage to sustain the highest per pupil spending in the state. 
Conversely, some of the tax-wealthy districts in the upstate, such as Greenville, choose to levy a
lower mill rate and have per pupil spending below the state average. It is difficult to isolate the
effect of demand influences
(the tax base per pupil), a problem economists call the identification problem. 
Figure 1













Per Pupil Mfg. Property, 1991
Figure 3
Per Pupil Spending, 1991-92
Fiscal Surplus as a Location Incentive-To develop a description of the "tax and education 
attractiveness" of a district, we defined two new variables that relate the cost-benefit calculation 
for the taxpayer to state-assessed taxable wealth in each district. The first variable we defined is

































public service benefits and tax costs of living in a particular district. Normally fiscal surplus is
defined as the difference between the benefits and the tax costs. A positive number is a fiscal
surplus, a negative number a fiscal deficit. Taxpayers would be expected, other things being 
equal, to locate in that district that gave them the highest fiscal surplus. Because school funding 
comes from outside sources as well, and because we want to compare across taxpayers with 
different amounts of taxable assets, we chose to express the fiscal surplus as a ratio rather than a
difference. The number is meaningful only in a relative sense. The values ranged from 15.5 
(Lexington 3) to 88.3 (York 2) in 1991, with a mean of 32.5. (See Appendix 1).
If we assume that the benefits of the education system to the average taxpayer are roughly 
proportional to per pupil spending, then this variable offers a proxy for marginal benefit per 
dollar spent, appropriately scaled to be comparable among districts and taxpayers. By combining 
the tax rate and spending variables, we can overcome some of the identification problem of the
relative influence of demand factors (preference for more education spending) and tax capacity 
factors.
The second variable is a measure of state-assessed taxable wealth per pupil (manufacturing and 
utility property and the associated business personal property). This scaled measure is the percent
of the tax base that was state-assessed in 1991, multiplied by the dollar amount of the total tax 
base per pupil.
These two variables show a reasonably strong positive relationship with an R-squared of .44. If
we omit the two wealthy coastal school districts with a very low percent of state-assessed 
property, Horry and Beaufort, the R-squared increases to .48, implying that about half the
variance in the fiscal attractiveness of school district is explained by differences in the
manufacturing and utility component of the tax base.
Since the state provided about half of school revenues in 1991-92 under an equalization formula, 
this result offers persuasive evidence that there is a substantial and consistent difference in the
fiscal attractiveness of school districts to firms as well as to commercial and residential
development. Because the property of manufacturers and utilities is assessed at 2.5 times the rate
of owner-occupied residential property and 1.7 times the rate of commercial property, these
differences in fiscal surplus are greatly magnified for manufacturing and utility firms.
V. What Do Other States Do?
The issue of inequality in taxable resources among school districts is one that all states have
wrestled with at least since the mid 1970s, when several California state court decisions put the
rest of the country on notice that the state was responsible for guaranteeing at least minimal
standards of educational quality in all its school districts. The most famous decision, Serrano v. 
Priest (1979), ruled that the quality of a child's education should not depend on the wealth of the
district in which that child resides. The timing of these court decisions on school finance
equalization coincided with the property tax revolt, first in California, then elsewhere--a backlash 



























Higher State Funding Shares-There are some common aspects to states' responses to both the
property tax revolt and the pressures for school finance equalization. Most states (34 in all) chose
to increase the state share of funding for K-12 education. Between 1969-70 and 1989-90, the
average share of education funding from the state increased from 40.9% to 47.2% in the United 
States average. (In 1990, Hawaii led all states in the state share (87.3%), while New Hampshire-
with no state broad-based income or sales tax-put most of the school financing burden (88.8%) 
on local governments and the local property tax.) South Carolina, however, was moving against
the trend, shifting more of the funding of education toward the local property tax between 1970 
and 1990. 
The most widely used remedy in other states was to shift the tax base supporting education from
the local property tax to state revenue sources, primarily sales taxes, which have risen sharply in 
the last decade. This approach attacks both problems at once--school finance equalization, and 
property tax relief--although at some expense in terms of local control and local responsibility. In 
California, a study by Thomas Downes [1992] found that California had indeed greatly reduced 
disparities in per pupil spending by 1985-86 by shifting a larger share of education funding to the
state level.
The most dramatic recent shift from local to state funding of education took place in Michigan in 
1994, where an effort to abolish the property tax entirely failed, but resulted in a dramatic shift
away from local property taxes (2/3 of school funding) toward higher state sales taxes as a major 
school revenue source. Like other states, however, Michigan found that it was not feasible to 
completely eliminate the role of the property tax in school financing. There are only three broad-
based sources of state and local taxes--income, sales, and property taxes. With competition from
neighboring states limiting overuse of the first two, the property tax continues to have a role to 
play in financing overall state and local public services, even if that role has been diminished in 
the last two decades. 
Creative Solutions: Texas and New Mexico-Some states have also devised unique solutions. 
Texas, with over 1,000 school districts, has paired the richest and poorest districts and ordered a
direct transfer from the former to the latter. New Mexico has a long history of dedicating the
property tax to schools (city and county governments rely on local income taxes), but the state
collects the property tax and redistributes it to school districts. 
VI. Policy Options For South Carolina
If South Carolina chooses to reduce inequality among districts in both per pupil spending and 
fiscal surplus, the experience of other states suggests some possible directions for resolution. The
fact that a significant share of the property tax base is assessed by the state points to several
possible options. State assessed property in South Carolina--manufacturing plants, utilities, and 
their personal property--accounted for about 40% of the property tax base in 1991. If this wealth 
were distributed uniformly among school districts, the variations in taxable wealth among 
districts would decline substantially. In 1991, the mean taxable wealth per pupil was $10,215, 
with a standard deviation of $9,017, and ranging all the way from $3,886 in Marion 3 to $75,883 























basis, the taxable wealth per pupil would be unchanged, but the standard deviation would fall to 
$4,341. 
State Collection of Industrial Property Tax-There is no way to redistribute such wealth 
directly, but it can be done indirectly, as it is in New Mexico and (to a lesser degree) in Texas. 
The state could collect the property taxes on the property assessed by the state and distribute that
revenue among the 91 school districts on a per pupil basis. While this step would not eliminate
the need for state aid, it would considerably simplify the problem of distribution of state aid, 
because the differentials among districts in taxable wealth per pupil would be less than half as
large. 
Would the tax burden on manufacturers and utilities rise under such a plan? Not necessarily. 
There are two possible ways to ensure that the burden on firms does not rise solely because of
this shift. One is to use a "hypothetical" rate, the one that would raise the same amount of
revenue from state-assessed property as the existing structure of rates in the 91 school districts. 
This method would treat all firms alike, especially new firms, but would also create massive
short term adjustments for established firms. Some would gain a windfall tax reduction, others
experiencing a sudden jump in property taxes. Such a system would have to be phased in to 
minimize the impact on both firms and districts. The difficulty with relying on a hypothetical rate
is that there is no criterion for what rate to use in future years. The attraction, however, is a
uniform statewide school property tax rate for all industry.
Figure 4
School Mills Rates, 1991
A second possible redistribution method is for the state to collect taxes at the locally set school
mill rate that applies to residential, commercial and personal property in that district, but to 
collect the revenue at the state level and redistribute it on a per pupil basis. This solution would 
avoid the windfall gains and losses of the uniform statewide rate, but would create other 
problems in setting local mill rates. At present, school districts (at least those that have some


























industrial development in setting the mill rate. Under this proposed system, the tradeoffs in mill
rates and revenues are not entirely internalized within the districts. A higher mill rate would 
generate more revenue for the local school district from homeowners and other locally taxed 
property owners, but the higher taxes on industrial property drive away potential employers
without benefiting the local district, because the revenues go into the multi-district pool. With 
less extra revenue per mill, this system would encourage lower property tax rates but also put
more pressure on the state to require a minimum tax effort and guarantee minimum standards , or 
to assume a larger share of funding. 
Reassigning Tax Liability Between Industrial and Other Property-A third option, which 
could be combined with either of the two rate-setting options above, is to require industrial
(state-assessed) property to pay only school taxes, exempting all firms, new and old, from county 
and city property taxes. Other property--commercial, residential, agricultural, and personal--
would pay city and county taxes but not school taxes. This change would primarily impact
counties, since industry makes up a much smaller share of municipal tax bases. If the burden 
were shifted in this way, the total property tax burden on industry would actually decline by 
about $100 million at 1993 tax levels. The tax burden on homeowners, agricultural property, and 
individual personal property would have to rise by an equal amount to fully fund cities, counties, 
and special districts at 1993 tax levels, from approximately $900 million to $1 billion (based on 
estimates supplied by the Department of Revenue). This shift would partly offset the $195 
million in school property tax relief just provided to homeowners by the 1995 General
Assembly, and might require further adjustments in the division of financing responsibilities
between state and local sources. 
This proposal is appealing not only because of simplicity but also in terms of economic theory. 
The property tax on residential and commercial property has some aspects of a benefit tax, in 
that many of the city and county services it is used to finance (such as police and fire protection 
and solid waste collection and disposal) convey benefits to property. To the extent that property 
taxes on residential and commercial property are used to fund schools, the benefit aspect of the
property tax is diluted for many taxpayers, who do not benefit directly from schools. Limiting 
property taxes on county-assessed property to city and county taxes would enhance the benefit
nature of the property tax and might make it more acceptable to many taxpayers.
Industrial and utility property does require some limited services from local government, but
many of those can be or already are provided on a fee basis. On the other hand, as major 
employers, these firms have a significant vested interest in the quality of the schools from which 
they draw their employees and which the managers' and employees' children attend. With a
growing population of singles, elderly, and childless couples, the direct benefit link between the
home and the school has attenuated, while the need for a more skilled labor force has
strengthened the benefit aspect of school property taxes for industry. 
These three options are not exhaustive, but they do suggest that there are many ways to provide
more equalization of resources among school districts and reduce existing differences in fiscal
surpluses. From an economic standpoint, eliminating this distortion in fiscal choice should result
in more efficient location decisions by most taxpayers, but especially industrial taxpayers facing 
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